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Banned Bodies, Spurned Speech: 
Butler, Kristeva and the location of a 'maternal language' 
Erin Wunker 
Cet article propose de revenir sur la critique que fait Butler de Kristeva, 
notamment sur la thiorie du langage poitique. Butler misinterpr2te la 
thiorie de Kristeva et, ce faisant, mine son propre argument selon lequel le 
genre est perjormatiJ: En (re)venant ir Butler et en me penchant sur 
Kristeva, j'abom'e ensuite le discours fiministe qui se demande comment 
traduire la thiorie en pratique: comment le langage poitique de Kristeva 
peut-il fonctionner dans le sens d'un#minisme d'avenir? Relue du point de 
vue de Kristeva, la thiorie de la perjormativiti du genre de Butlerpeut-elle 
&ire re'habilite'e? Comment un lien entre le langage poitique de Kristeva et 
la perjormance de butler part-il dicentrer de faqon productive la structure 
du pouvoir partriarcal hitirosexualise'? 
Judith Butler has suggested that gender is a "cultural configuration" (Gender 
Trouble 190). She posits that gender categories are predicated on the grounds of 
exclusion, and what is at stake is the power of identity. I refer, here, to Butler's 
preceding remarks wherein she states that "the foundationalist reasoning of iden- 
tity politics tends to assume that an identity must first be in place in order for 
political interests to be elaborated and, subsequently, political action to be taken" 
(181). She maintains, throughout her text, that in the present socio-cultural "con- 
figuration" a subject must be read as such-be culturally identifiable-in order 
to begin to enact political change. The thrust of Butler's argument is, in short, 
that gender is culturally prescribed to a subject (in order to render that subject 
identifiable), however, Butler takes great pains to demonstrate that gender is an 
arbitrary construction and that, as there are only two "culturally identifiable" 
genders, this process is inherently exclusionary. She maintains, moreover, that 
systematically categorizing gender works to undermine the subversive potential 
of individualistic identity. I will speak to this last point throughout the course of 
the paper. If power-moreover heterosexualized patriarchal power-is struc- 
tured to exclude a majority of the population, then it follows that at the very least 
there should exist, within the excluded majority, a desire to subvert that power. 
It is curious, then, that Butler's critique of Julia Kristeva's "body politics" hinge 
on what Butler sees as an impossible and inadequate politics of subversion (102). 
Kristeva, in her work on subject-formation, relies on the multiple meanings 
available in language (what she calls poetic language) as a means by which to 
subvert the patriarchal law of power. Poetic language, for Kristeva, offers a way 
to reconnect with the 'maternal body'-a 'body' that psychoanalysis maintains 
every subject must turn from in order to enter into the socio-symbolic order. One 
could make the argument that 'figure' or 'specter' could work interchangeably 
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with 'body,' however I choose to use 'body' deliberately as I read Kristeva as 
gesturing toward both the physical maternal body as well as the psychoanalytic 
concept of the Mother. Butler, herself, is engaged in an argument that positions 
the gendered body as performative. She claims that any categorization of gen- 
dered bodies is always a practice of exclusion (7). Yet, Butler resists Kristeva's 
subject-theories. She posits that Kristeva "offers us a strategy of subversion that 
can never become a sustained political practice" (103). This paper proposes to 
perform a return to Butler's critique of Kristeva, particularly her critique of Kris- 
teva's theory of poetic language. I suggest that Butler fundamentally misinter- 
prets Kristeva's subject-theory, and in doing so destabilizes her own pertinent 
argument that gender is performance. I will, in my (re)turn to Butler and my turn 
to Kristeva, enter into the feminist discourse that asks how theory can be trans- 
lated into practice: I will ask how Kristeva's poetic language works toward a 
feminism of the future. Furthermore, when re-read through the same Kristeva she 
rejects, I will question whether Butler's performative theory of gender may be 
rehabilitated. The paper will close by attempting to postulate a link between Kris- 
teva's poetic language and Butler's theory of performance that may locate a point 
at which to begin to practically de-center the heterosexualized patriarchal power 
structure. 
Butler opens Gender Trouble with an ideological crux that has plagued the 
feminist movement since its inception. She underscores that the relationship 
between feminist discourse and political action is contentious: the task of feminist 
theory has been to formulate a language that "fully or adequately represents 
women" in order for women to become a visible group within politics (4). T h e 
problem, however, is at the very root of representation: for a language to 
adequately represent a group, that group must be visible (4). In short, the 
task of feminist theory is to create a language that would, paradoxically, 
operate under those same cultural codes it wishes to expose and to change. 
The term "women" is necessary in so far as it indicates the group for 
whom it wishes to create political action, however, the very term glosses over the 
myriads of differences between women. Citing Michel Foucault, Butler further 
reveals the complexity of the feminist task. She notes, "Foucault points out that 
the juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to 
represent" (4). Thus the "subject" of feminism, the one(s) on whose behalf femi- 
nism acts, is theoretically produced by the "very political system that is supposed 
to facilitate its emancipation" (4). Feminist theory must proceed critically, for 
power (juridical power in Butler's terms), has a dual function: it both produces 
subjects-before-the-law, and simultaneously conceals its production (5). The task 
for feminist theory, as Butler sees it, is not only to question how women may best 
be represented (made visible) in the political and linguistic realms, but also to 
come to an understanding of "how the category of 'woman,' the subject of femi- 
nism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which 
emancipation is sought" (5). To be a subject-before-the-law is to stand before the 
Law and wait to be recognized, wait to be named. To be subject to and of the law 
is to be forced to wait in the periphery. Moreover, to wait to be made visible and 
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wait to be named both disempowers the subject, and creates a false (as well as 
limiting) concept of a single identity. The power of the Law rests in the con- 
ception that to be recognized by the Law is to be recognized as a subject. 
As Butler notes, the language available for political and theoretical action 
is incredibly limiting: the "women" feminist theory works for are, by the single 
term "women," displaced from their own specificity (6). While women are cer- 
tainly not all alike, feminist theory has taken up the linguistic tools available to 
make visible the people it works to help. Thus the disparity between Western 
women, Third World women, European women, Asian women, women of colour, 
poor women, wealthy women, middle class women, single mothers, women of 
various sexualities is bound up in a single word: 'women.' Butler's position is 
clear. She suggests that, "the presumed universality and unity of the subject of 
feminism is effectively undermined by the constraints of the representational dis- 
course in which it functions" (7). She posits, moreover, that the insistence-and I 
would suggest the perceived necessity-of maintaining the universal subject of 
feminism has resulted in "multiple refusals to accept the category" (7). 
A further complication for feminist theory arises when one begins to inves- 
tigate the distinctions between sex and gender (9). While sex has been generally 
accepted as biologically (and therefore indisputably) determined, gender is the cul- 
tural (and therefore disputable) inscription that a sexed body is prescribed (10). 
Gender, unfixed and disputable, should assume the same task assigned to feminist 
theory: gender should work to reveal the politico-cultural discourse that produces 
it ( l  l). Butler suggests that, "when the relevant 'culture' that 'constructs' gender is 
understood in terms of such a law or set of laws, then it seems that gender is deter- 
mined and fixed as it was under the biology-is-destiny formulation. In such a case, 
not biology, but culture, becomes destiny" (12). In the same way that a group is 
made visible through its very designation as a group, bodies become culturally 
intelligible through being marked as one gender or another (13). The socio-politi- 
CO-cultural realm makes meaning through language, thus, language becomes the 
prime 'maker' of sexed, gendered bodies. Thus, a simultaneous critical discourse 
must be taken up on the constitutive structure of language (13). 
Feminist theory must determine what it means to be a subject in and of 
language. Within a discourse, which has figured women as either a lack,' or an 
Other, Butler surmises that women also lack subjective agency. The constructed 
concept of "Being" is at the root of this complex discourse: 
It was grammar (the structure of the subject and the predicate) 
that inspired Descartes' certainty that "I" is the subject of 
"think," whereas it is rather the thoughts that come to "me": at 
the bottom, faith in grammar simply conveys the will to be the 
"cause" of one's thoughts. The subject, the self, the individual, 
are just so many false concepts, since they transform into sub- 
stances fictitious unities having at the start only a linguistic 
reality. (Haar 18) 
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The subject of any discourse is so much fiction: language creates the misconcep- 
tion of a single, fixed identity and wholeness of being. Further, language, in the 
Saussurian model, is itself an arbitrary system. It is a fiction that has been whole- 
heartedly taken up, however. As Louis Althusser suggests, "there is no ideology 
except by the subject for subjects. Meaning, there is no ideology except for con- 
crete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the sub- 
ject: meaning, by the category of the subject and its functioning" (130). Thus, to 
be a subject is to be subject to (and of) language. Butler's project, in the name of 
a politically effective feminist theory, is to crack open the linguistic fiction of sex 
and gender. In order to subvert the dominant, regulatory political discourse, sex, 
gender and the bodies they mark must be revealed as fictions. In so doing, femi- 
nist theory must interrogate not only the ways a subject is perceived to come into 
being, but also the ways in which a subject is interpolated into language. As I enter 
into a critique of Butler's (mis)reading of Kristeva's theory of poetic language I 
will momentarily outline the tenets of psychoanalytic discourse that form the 
foundations of Kristeva's writing. I will then turn to Butler's reading of Kristeva, 
and reread it alongside Kristeva's own words. Through this rereading, I hope to 
reveal that Kristeva's poetic language offers a means of discursive critique, as 
well as political efficacy, that Butler seeks. 
The formation of a subject is, in the Freudian theory, an inherently violent 
process. The child undergoes a double-trauma; first, the child realizes his or her 
body is separate from the mother's, and second, the child realizes that different 
bodies are (culturally) invested with different degrees of power. That is to say, the 
child understands that to be marked female is a far different thing than to be 
marked male."' For Freud, this realization is enacted through a psychical severing. 
He suggests that the child's primary investment is in his or her parents (1923, 
369). The story is as follows: the child, in Freud's terminology a male child, first 
invests his love energy into the mother. This investment has to do primarily with 
the mother's breast-the child's source of nourishment. The trouble begins when 
the child's investment in his mother becomes sexualized, and he begins to feel a 
sense of competition with the father. A fear of castration arises out of the sense of 
competition: the child fears the father will eliminate his potential potency. The 
boy's fear of his father is detrimental to himself, for the boy identifies with the 
father. In other words, a fear of the father is, in some ways, a fear of the parts of 
himself that the boy recognizes in the father. Fear threatens the boy's psyche. 
Thus, the child pushes his desire for his mother, as well as his fear of his father, 
back into his unconscious. The entire oedipal process is a process of repression. 
The child must repress his primary investment and either strengthen his identifi- 
cation with the father, or simply identify with the mother. As the child represses 
his primary identification, he simultaneously represses an integral part of himself. 
Thus, the child's formation of an ego-ideal is built on a fissured foundation. 
Girls undergo a similar process. In "Femininity" Freud addresses the 
subject-formation of girls. I draw this summary from Freud's 1933 essay 
"Femininity." In this version, the girl's object-cathexis, like the boy's, is first 
for her mother. The mother's position as object of love energy is, again, based 
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primarily on her position as food source. Once more, the trouble begins at the 
point when the girl's love energy for her mother is no longer simply related to 
nourishment from her mother's breast. In order to progress "normally," the 
girl must transfer both her libidinal-cathexis and her object-cathexis from her 
mother to her father. She unconsciously justifies such an illogical and violent 
move by resenting her mother for her lack of penis. Moreover, her resentment 
for her mother, and her rejection of her own body in favour of the phallus 
causes, I would suggest, the girl's rejection of a primary self. similar to her 
male counterpart, the female child represses a visceral and integral part of her 
earliest subjectivity. To be interpolated into society (where heterosexual desire 
is upheld as the norm) is to undergo a process of re-identification. A subject 
in society always operates with a fissured foundation. Freud suggests that a 
woman wishes to bear a child because she unconsciously believes that the 
child will fill her psychic lack: the child, a thing of worth, will, in turn fill her 
with worth and compensate for her lack of a phallus ("The Dissolution of the 
Oedipus Complex" 173). Already, in Freud, there is a gesture towards Kriste- 
va's reworking of the Mother and poetics. Kristeva studied psychoanalysis 
with Jacques Lacan, and it is from Lacan's work that Kristeva most clearly 
draws. 
Lacan takes up the Freudian fissured subject and reworks it into a linguis- 
tic theory of formati~n. '~ In Lacan's rendition of the search for selfhood, it is le 
nom du pdre, or Name-of-the-Father, that operates as the trump card in the desir- 
ing subject's quest for subjectivity. Le nom dupBre is what Lacan sees in language 
as the inherent gender inequity, which guarantees a certain (phallocentric) order 
(1977,48). The Name-of-the-Father is, in short, a rereading of Freud's process of 
oedipalization. The Father lays down the laws of the f a r n i l ~ . ~  For Lacan, our most 
prevalent mode of communication is language, thus the law is a linguistic law, 
"this law, then, is revealed clearly enough as identical with an order of language" 
(1977,66). Lacan posits that the child enters language-the symbolicYi order-at 
an early age (1977, 1). Importantly, in the Lacanian reading, the child enters the 
Symbolic "held tightly as he is by some support" (1977, 1). The child manages a 
degree of mastery over his or her supporting structures and "jubilantly assumes 
his [sic] specular image" (1977,2). In short, the child's entrance into the Symbolic 
comes through an opposition: the child forms an 'I' by pushing away the 'not I' 
(the supporting structures). Interestingly, Lacan figures the child's jubilant 
assumption as being predicated on a violent loss: "jouissance is suffering" (Lacan 
Seminar 7 184). In other words, the child's pleasure is founded on a repudiation 
of the "primary relationship with the maternal body" (Butler 101). Lacan main- 
tains that the body of the child, the child's ability to conceive of himlherself as 
a separate entity, is only possible through a psychical repression and physical 
rejection of the Mother. What is necessary, in Butler's project, then, is a sub- 
version of this linguistic hegemony that inscribes gender and regulates bodies. I 
would suggest, further, that an effective subversive critique must necessarily 
come from the margins of discourse. I do not mean to suggest that one must be 
utterly outside language and culture--such a suggestion would be impossible. 
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Rather, I would suggest, as Kristeva does, that such a critique must be posited as 
a rupture (Reader 99). 
Stemming from Husserlian phenomenology, Kristeva asserts that a cri- 
tique of the law (doxa for Husserl, culture for Butler) must be strategically posi- 
tioned as a rupture, or break, in the signifying process (Reader 98). Asserting itself 
from the periphery, this critical rupture may open a subversive space within the 
subject. Kristeva positions herself on the margins of discourse: she is both a 
stranger in the country in which she lives and works, and a stranger among her 
colleagues."ii Her task, as she saw it early in her career, was "to work on language, 
to labour in the materiality of that which society regards as a means of contact and 
understanding [is] to declare oneself a strangerlforeign [ktranger] to language" 
(3). Kristeva's theory of a subject's formation uses Lacan's theory as a point of 
departure. She has, as Allison Weir notes, been criticized both for her adherence 
to the Lacanian notion of the Phallus, and for her virtual deification of mother- 
hood (145). Nonetheless, I suggest that, through a reading of Kristeva's subject 
theory (itself a strategic re-formulation of Lacanian theory), we may uncover the 
tools for enacting the subversive critique that Butler seeks. 
Kristeva's theory of subject formation, as I have suggested, draws heavily 
from the work of Lacan. However, as Weir points out, in Kristeva's work jouis- 
sance-pleasur+has infinite potential (150). Moreover, unlike Lacan and Freud, 
Kristeva figures the child's necessary repression, the repression of the Mother as 
primary love object, as a pleasurable process (Weir 15 1). Weir suggests, "the plea- 
sure of differentiation, the pleasure of signification, the pleasure of identification 
with others, the pleasure of learning to participate in the social world, all are the- 
matized by Kristeva as essential to the formation of self-identity" (151). At the 
root of this pleasure lies the subject's primary repression. This repression, unlike 
the repression of Freud, of Lacan, is a secreting-away of the primary self, what 
Weir translates as "an acceptance of otherness within the self," and what I would 
suggest is, in fact, the origin of the Freudian concept of the uncanny (152). In 
short, Kristeva believes that in order to accept the differences of others, we must 
accept the strangers within ourselves: we must accept that primary repression of 
our selves which remains in the unconscious."iii To recognize strangeness within 
the self, and to find pleasure in the process of becoming a subject, is to reformu- 
late the very concept of what a subject is. Weir notes that, with this concept of 
pleasure in mind, Kristeva's understanding of a subject inlof language is particu- 
larly unique: 
[Kristeva] criticizes the structuralist understanding of language 
solely in terms of structure or system or code, and argues instead 
from a theory of language as a discursive practice of subjects. 
Thus, Kristeva's   post structural ism^' is unlike that of Derrida 
and Butler, who see the subject as nothing more than a reflection 
of function of the law of language, and who therefore want to 
move beyond the subject . . . Kristeva . . . argues for the rein- 
troduction of the subject, the body and history into analyses of 
language-for, that is, an understanding of language in terms of 
human discourse. (153-4) 
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Thus, Kristeva's theory of language, as well as her theory of the subject idof lan- 
guage, points toward a radical alternative to both the Structuralists and many of 
the poststructuralists. 
Revolution in Poetic Language is concerned with the "signifling process 
vis-his  general theories of meaning, theories of language and theories of the sub- 
ject" (1986, 90). While refusing to utterly eschew the Freudian and Lacanian 
model of a fragmented subject, a subject comprised of "substance morcel6e," 
Kristeva suggests that the subject idof language is actually "in procession trial" 
(1986, 91). While even this notion is imperfect, what Kristeva makes clear is the 
contentious "modalities that are inseparable within the signifling process that 
constitutes language . . . in other words, so-called 'natural' language allows for 
different modes of articulation of the semiotic and the symbolic" (1986,93). Kris- 
teva takes the term 'semiotic' from "its Greek sense: 6dBI3ii = distinctive mark, 
trace, index, precursory sign, proof, engraved or written sign, imprint, trace, figu- 
ration" (1986,93). Put simply, the 'semiotic' is in the order of primary repression. 
The 'symbolic' may be understood in terms of the Lacanian model: language as 
uttered and understood through the Law. Unlike her predecessors, Kristeva sug- 
gests that there are both linguistic and non-linguistic systems that contribute to 
the subject's formation (1986, 93). Most importantly she posits, "because the 
subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he [sic] pro- 
duces can be either 'exclusively' semiotic or 'exclusively' symbolic, and is 
instead necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both" (1986, 93). This is a 
substantially different reading than the one Butler presents in Gender Trouble. 
Butler reads Kristeva to say that: 
The 'semiotic' is a dimension of language occasioned by that 
primary maternal body, which not only refutes Lacan's primary 
premise, but serves as a perpetual source of subversion within 
the Symbolic. For Kristeva, the semiotic expresses the original 
libidinal multiplicity within the very terms of culture, more pre- 
cisely, within poetic language in which multiple meanings and 
semantic non-closure prevail. (102) 
Butler goes on to suggest that "Kristeva's strategy of subversion proves doubt- 
ful," because it "appears to depend on the stability and production of precisely 
the paternal law she seeks to displace" (102). Butler appears to be reading into 
Kristeva a binary that is simply not there: while Butler reads the semiotic and the 
symbolic as divisible, Kristeva has clearly theorized that the two are siarnesed 
concepts. As we have seen, Kristeva conceives of a subject that is neither whol- 
ly semiotic, nor utterly symbolic. Rather, the subject engages discursively with 
each. Moreover, Butler rejects the theory of poetic language as unequivocally 
related to a "prediscursive libidinal economy" that is meant both to subvert the 
regulatory terms of culture, and paradoxically cannot "be maintained within the 
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terms of culture" (102). Yet, Kristeva tell us that poetic language is, "at least 
double. The word . . . thus turns out to occupy the status of mediatol; linking struc- 
tural models to cultural (historical) environment, as well as that of regulatol; con- 
trolling mutations from diachrony to synchrony" (1986,37). Instead of causing the 
psychic breakdown of a subject, poetic language both acknowledges the ruptures, 
and act as a means of 'articulating' what object-relations psychoanalyst Melanie 
Klein has called "the analytically unthinkable" (1986, 103). In short, Butler over- 
looks Kristeva's distinct use of psychoanalytic theory: poetic language functions as 
a means of articulating that which defies the structure of language. Rather than 
direct her interrogation to how poetic language may work for political practice after 
all, Butler embarks on a misreading of the psychoanalytic theory of drives (103). 
Butler posits, in her critique of Kristeva, that, "the key to Kristeva's view 
of the psychotic nature of homosexuality is to be understood . . . in her accep- 
tance of the structuralist assumption that heterosexuality is coextensive with the 
founding of the Symbolic" (107). This is a particularly poor translation of Kriste- 
va's refiguration of the Freudian and Lacanian models of subject formation. One 
recalls that, for both Freud and Lacan, the child's subject formation is, indeed, a 
heterosexualizing process. One may also recall, though Butler clearly does not, 
that this process is enacted under the regulation of the (culturally constructed and 
maintained) Law of the Father. To be understood as a subject, the subject transfers 
hisher primary identification to the appropriate parent. The child is subject to the 
Law. However, Butler draws her critique on Kristeva from "Motherhood 
According to Giovanni Bellini." Butler says, "Kristeva suggests that, because the 
maternal body signifies the loss of coherent and discrete identity, poetic language 
verges on psychosis" (107). What Kristeva actually says is that, "the homosexual- 
maternal facet is a whirl of words, a complete absence of meaning and seeing; it 
is feeling, displacement, rhythm, sound, flashes, and fantasied clinging to the 
maternal body as a screen against the plunge" (1980, 240). The subject who is 
engaged in poetic language, importantly for Kristeva this is a female subject, is 
absolutely other to her self. She is strange to herself. The whirl of words that 
have no meaning are, I would suggest, indicators of the primary repressed self, 
the primordial self, the self of the child who did not need to read the marks of 
sex and gender. The subject who is strange to her self, who holds within herself 
absolute alterity, is, I would argue, more able to recognize and appreciate the 
alterity of others.Ix Furthermore, to suggest that Kristeva is making a Struc- 
turalist assumption is absurd. To be clear I will reference Deleuze and Guattari 
who posit, in Anti-Oedipus, that, "if desire is repressed, it is because every posi- 
tion of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the 
established order of a society" (116). Poetic language is the language of the 
desiring subject. It is the language of the primary repressed self. It is homo- 
sexual insofar as it has refused interpolation into the Law. Moreover, Kristeva's 
theory that "by giving birth, the woman enters into contact with her mother; she 
becomes, she is her own mother; they are the same continuity differentiating 
itself' is not the melancholic process Butler perceives it to be (107, 108). 
Rather, the metaphorX of birth, of motherhood is a potentially revolutionary act. 
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Gayatri Spivak reads the metaphor of mothering to indicate a de-valuing of "nor- 
mative essentialisms" (67). She goes on to say that it doesn't matter "if I have no 
children and therefore no experience of 'giving the mother to the other woman.' 
It is a general sense of mothering-its minimal definitive and presupposed cul- 
tural predication as selfless love . . . a relationship with the other woman-who 
is precisely not a child of my body" (68). Poetic language is not evidenced 
through the formulation of "lesbian sexuality as intrinsically unintelligible," nor 
is it a "tactical dismissal and reduction of the lesbian experience performed in the 
name of the law," as Butler suggests (1 11). Rather, poetic language is the language 
that defies that law, it "puts the subject in processlon trial through a network of 
l marks and semiotic facilitations . . . the moment it stops being mere instinctual 
glossolalia and becomes part of the linguistic order, poetry meets up with denota- 
l 
tion and enunciation-verisimilitude and the subject-and, through them, the 
social" (1986, 110). In short, what Butler overlooks is the performative potential 
of poetic language. 
Butler brings her critique of Kristeva to a close with the suggestion that, 
"if subversion [of the Law] is possible, it will be a subversion from within the 
terms of the law, through the possibilities that emerge when the law turns against 
itself and spawns unexpected permutations of itself' (119). In other words, a 
l 
politically effective subversion of the law that regulates and marks bodies would 
have to occur within the very structures of that law. The subversive action would 
I have to be read and understood as performative. As set out in speech-act theory, 
I performative language is language that "does not simply make a statement, but 
also performs an action" (Austin 5-6). Butler suggests that the gendered body is 
performative, insofar as the "essence or identity that [it] otherwise purport[s] to 
express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and 
other discursive means" (173). If we begin to understand the bodies we inhabit in 
terms of their gendered performativity, then "the political regulations and disci- 
plinary practices" that produce these gendered bodies may be made visible, and 
critiqued (Butler 174). The question then becomes what language to use to cri- 
tique these bodies, and whether the subject may ever be engaged in subverting the 
law while remaining intelligible by that same law. I would suggest that Kristeva's 
subject in processlon trial does just that. The subject in processlon trial can be read 
as "the mobile, unfixed, subversive writing subject" (Moi in Kristeva 1986, 89). 
Further, the subject in process/on trial is a subject engaged with poetic language. 
As Butler suggests, at the beginning of Gender Trouble, to be subject to/of the law 
is a paradoxical concept. Feminist theory has struggled with the problem of 
representation because of this paradox. I would suggest that what Butler misses in 
Kristeva's theory of poetic language is the inherent concept of movement: poetic 
language moves faster than the structures that wish to fix it in place. For feminist 
theory to harness the power of poetic language would be to harness the Kristevan 
jouissance of the primal, unmarked body. I suggest that this is possible through a 
strategic feminist model of performative writing. 
Peggy Phelan posits that, "performative writing enacts the death of the 
'we' that we think we are before we begin to write. A statement of allegiance to 
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the radicality of unknowing who we are becoming, this writing pushes against the 
normative ideology that insists that we die once in an expository, teleologically 
driven future" (17). Moreover, Phelan suggests, "performative writing is an 
attempt to find a form for "what philosophy wishes all the same to say" (11). 
Performative writing operates from the margins of discourse, toward the center: 
its form resists structure, while its content engages in discourse. Feminist theory 
must conceive of a manner of writing the political performatively, from the mar- 
gins, toward the center. A performative critique of the Law would be a critique 
that not only speaks, but also acts.xi 
Notes 
' ~ u t l e r  is, of course, drawing this from Luce Irigaray, who suggests that "woman" 
is multiple, rather than singular and fixed (15). Irigaray posits, moreover, that 
"woman" cannot be adequately represented through language, "woman" is inar- 
ticulable. For a more comprehensive discussion of woman-as-lack see Irigaray's 
Ce Sexe qui n 'en est pas un, as well as Speculum of the Other Woman. 
ii Clearly, as Butler cites Haar who, in turn, references Descartes, the notions of 
"Being" taken up here are in the tradition of Enlightenment thinking. Though it is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is pertinent to note that, in Strangers to 
Ourselves, Kristeva posits an earlier, different notion of the subject as put forth by 
Montesquieu. 
"' Critics of Freud often overlook two points: first, Freud began his practice in 
a socio-historical moment as well as a geographic location (Vienna) that had 
incredibly structured gender divisions. Men were certainly granted far more 
social and economic power than women. Secondly, Freud's patients were main- 
ly upper and upper middle class women who were extremely restricted in both 
their social and physical movement. For a more complex discussion of this see 
Freud's and Breuer's case studies of hysterics. The case history of Anna 0. is 
particularly compelling as an early example. 
lV Lacan draws from Saussure, but it is the work of structural anthropologist 
Claude L6vi-Strauss that initiates Lacan's decisive "linguistic turn" (Evans 102). 
It is Lacan's theory of the unconscious-that it is structured like languag+that 
most clearly places him within the Structuralist discourse. As I shall go on to sug- 
gest, it is Kristeva's reluctance to absolutely claim Structuralism as her own that 
puts her theory of poetic language in a position to elucidate Butler's work. 
V Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that the law of 
the family is based on a prohibition of incest. See Freud's Totem and Taboo, and well 
as Lacan's "The function of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud". 
This is a great simplification of the Lacanian Symbolic order. The Symbolic, for 
Lacan, is drawn from the anthropological work of LBvi-Strauss who posits that 
society (culture) is structured by "certain kinship relations and gift-economies" 
(Evans 201). Thus, for Lacan, the Symbolic takes up notions of gift-giving and 
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circuits of exchange. Moreover, the Symbolic is not simply the order of language, 
though, as Evans points out, the dual concepts of Law and Structure cannot exist 
without Language (201). Thus "the symbolic realm of language is the signifier; a 
dimension in which elements have no positive existence but which are 
constituted purely by virtue of their mutual differences. . . . The Symbolic is also 
the realm of radical alterity" (Evans 202). 
In her introduction to The Kristeva Reader Toril Moi notes that Kristeva was 
one of very few women who worked within the intellectual climate of the TelQuel 
group. Kristeva herself suggests that her position as a gendered minority had a 
direct effect on her work: "It was perhaps necessary to be a woman to attempt to 
take up that exorbitant wager of carrying the rational project to the outer borders 
of the signifying venture of men" (qtd. by Moi in Reader 3) .  
V"' Kristeva discusses this concept of strangeness at length in her text Strangers to 
Ourselves. My suggestion that the concept of the Uncanny may, in fact come from 
a periodic recognition of the primary repressed self (hence the strange familiari- 
ty) draws on the final chapter of this text. 
lX My suggestion comes from a reading of Kristeva's Strangers to Ourselves 
wherein she posits that a recognition of our own strangeness could lead to a poli- 
tics of cosmopolitanism that avoids the erasure of difference, instead figuring dif- 
b ference as an inevitable and important facet of every day life in the globalized 
world. 
X Butler's reading of motherhood and birthing is presented as a particularly 
literal reading that overlooks Kristeva's use of metaphor. According to Paul 
Ricouer, the metaphor points to "that sort of discourse that has no denotation 
but only connotations" (122). In other words, metaphors gesture towards that 
which cannot be said directly. 
X' (What is the impact of the belief-psychoanalytic and philosophical-that the 
female body is situated around a 'lack'? Moreover, what is the impact of being 
told I do not exist? If, as Freud suggests, I form my self through a process of 
violent wounding and repression, then how am I to stage a return to my self'? It 
is as though I exist only on the periphery, in parenthesis. Am 'I' to exist always 
in the margins . . . on the periphery . . . buried in a footnote? No. What are 
the powers of performance but an embodiment of subversive acts? 'I' will 
process, perform from the margins and toward the center in order to destabilize 
matrix of power, for, things fall apart, and the structure cannot hold . . .) 
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